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I. INTRODUCTION
The new America Invents Act (AIA) post-grant proceedings,
inter partes review (IPR) and post-grant review (PGR), provide an
opportunity for third parties to challenge issued patent claims in the
United States Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO).' A third party
requests an IPR or PGR via a petition, which is reviewed by a panel of
three Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) judges against the
threshold of "a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail
with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition" for
an IPR2 and "more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims
challenged in the petition is unpatentable" for a PGR.3 If PTAB
concludes that the threshold is met with respect to at least one
challenged claim on at least one asserted ground, it then grants the
petition and institutes an IPR or PGR.4 Ultimately, PTAB determines
if the petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence
whether any challenged claims are unpatentable.5 There is no
presumption of validity of the issued claims.
Claim construction plays a key role both in the institution
decision6 and in the ultimate final written decision (FWD).7 PTAB
1 35 U.S.C. §§ 311,321 (2012).
2 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).
3 35 U.S.C. § 324(a).
4 In re Schott Gemtron Corp., -F.3d (Fed. Cir. Aug. 11, 2015), aff'd sub nom.
Schott Gemtron Corp. v. SSW Holding Comp., Inc. (August 11, 2015),
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/opinions-orders/15-
1073.Rule 36 Judgment.8-10-2015.1.PDF [http://perma.cc/KXH4-WH5R] (stating
that the Federal Circuit decided that it was acceptable for PTAB to institute on fewer
than all challenged claims and/or fewer than all asserted grounds).
5 35 U.S.C. §§ 318(a), 328(a); 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(d) (2015).
6 adidas AG v. NIKE, Inc., No. IPR2013-00067, Paper 18, at 10 (P.T.A.B. May
17, 2014) ("As a first step in our analysis for determining whether to institute a trial,
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has to construe the claims to review the patentability of a challenged
claim against the grounds of unpatentability asserted in the petition.
It may also have to construe the claims to assess entitlement to a
priority date.8 In PGRs, where asserted grounds of unpatentability
may include § 112 issues,9 the claims may have to be construed to
assess compliance with § 112.
Both the petitioner and the patent owner may propose claim
constructions prior to PTAB's institution decision. The petitioner
must do so in the petition,0 and the patent owner may do so in the
(optional) Patent Owner Preliminary Response (POPR).1
For practitioners, therefore, the new AIA post-grant proceedings
mean that PTAB is a whole new audience that must be taken into
account when drafting patent applications. This article will discuss the
role of claim construction in AIA post-grant proceedings, specifically
analyzing PTAB's claim construction decisions in IPRs to date.12 The
article concludes with suggestions for patent drafting and prosecution
based on the lessons learned from PTAB claim construction decisions
so far.
II. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION STANDARDS USED BY PTAB
A. The "Broadest Reasonable Interpretation" (BRI) and Phillips
13
Standards
PTAB determines the scope of unexpired claims according to
their "broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of
the patent in which it appears.' 4 According to the USPTO Rules
we construe the claims."); Corning Inc. v. DSM IP Assets B.V., No. IPR2013-00043,
Paper 14, at 4 (P.T.A.B. May 13, 2013) ("As a step in our analysis for determining
whether to institute a trial, we determine the meaning of the claims.").
7 See, e.g., adidas AG v. NIKE, Inc., No. IPR2013-00067, Paper 60, at 11-23
(P.T.A.B. Apr. 28, 2014); Corning Inc. v. DSM IP Assets B.V., No. IPR2013-00043,
Paper 95, at 8 (P.T.A.B. May 1, 2014). See Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett &
Dunner, LLP Research (July 1, 2015), http://www.aiablog.com/claim-and-case-
disposition/ [http://perma.cc/N9Q8-RARZ] (with thanks to Dan Klodowski, Kai
Rajan, Elliot Cook, and Joe Schaffner).
8 See, e.g., ButamaxTM Advanced Biofuels LLC v. Gevo, Inc., No. IPR2013-
00539, Paper 33 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 3, 2015).
9 35 U.S.C. §321 (b).
10 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.104(b)(3), 42.204(b)(3).
11 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.107, 42,207.
12 As of Aug. 25, 2015, only 13 PGR petitions have been filed. Three have been
instituted. Two settled prior to an institution decision.
13 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc), cert. denied,
126 S. Ct. 1332 (2006).
14 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b).
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Commentary, this standard is consistent with the statute, case law, and
Congressional intent:
This rule is consistent with the provisions of 35 U.S.C. 316,
as amended.... This rule is also consistent with
longstanding established principles of claim construction
before the Office.
15
For nearly thirty years, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit has continued to require the Office
to give patent claims their broadest reasonable
construction consistent with the specification in
patentability determination proceedings .... The "broadest
reasonable interpretation" standard has been well
established for nearly thirty years in the judicial precedent
for construing patent claims in patentability determination
proceedings before the Office.
16
The provisions of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act
indicate that the typical standard applicable to USPTO
proceedings should apply as well to these trial
proceedings.'
7
The Office and courts have been applying these standards
for nearly thirty years when construing patent claims.
Congress recognized the "broadest reasonable
interpretation" standard in the legislative history of the
AIA, and did not set forth a different standard or mandate
the Office to apply the district court's standard.'8
In the first appeal of a PTAB FWD, In re Cuozzo, 793 F.3d 1268
(Fed. Cir. 2015), the Federal Circuit explicitly discussed the
15 Changes to Implement Inter Partes Review Proceedings, Post-Grant Review
Proceedings, and Transitional Program for Covered Business Method Patents, 77 Fed.
Reg. 48,680, 48,688 (Aug. 14, 2012) (to be codified at 37 CFR Part 42); see id. at
48,690 for corresponding comment about post-grant reviews.
16 77 Fed. Reg. 48,680, 48,697 (Aug. 14, 2012).
17 77 Fed. Reg. 48,680, 48,697.
18 77 Fed. Reg. 48,680, 48,698-99 48,688; see id. at 48, 690 for corresponding
comment about post-grant reviews; see also Office Patent Trial Guide, 77 Fed. Reg.
48,756, 48,764 (Aug. 14, 2012) (to be codified at 37 CFR pt. 42) ("The Office has for
decades employed the broadest reasonable interpretation standard to construe claims
before the Office, and it will continue to do so in IPR, PGR, and CBM proceedings
for construing challenged claims as well as any amended or new claims.").
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appropriateness of PTAB using a BRI standard in IPRs, and
approved it. Cuozzo argued that the "broadest reasonable
interpretation standard is inappropriate in an adjudicatory IPR
proceeding."'9  The PTO argued that "the broadest reasonable
interpretation is appropriately applied in the IPR context."
20
The Federal Circuit upheld PTAB's use of BRI:
This court has approved of the broadest reasonable
interpretation standard in ... every PTO proceeding
involving unexpired patents. ... There is no indication that
the AIA was designed to change the claim construction
standard that the PTO has applied for more than 100 years.
... Congress in enacting the AIA was well aware that the
broadest reasonable interpretation standard was the
prevailing rule ... It can therefore be inferred that
Congress impliedly adopted the existing rule of adopting
the broadest reasonable construction .... We conclude that
Congress implicitly adopted the broadest reasonable
interpretation standard in enacting the AIA. 2'
The Federal Circuit noted that regardless of the support from the
past precedent, the USPTO's AIA-implementing rule requiring
application of BRI [37 C.F.R. §42.100(b)] was within the USPTO's
authority to make:
The broadest reasonable interpretation standard affects
both the PTO's determination of whether to institute IPR
proceedings and the proceedings after institution and is
within the PTO's authority under the statute.... Even if the
broadest reasonable interpretation standard were not
incorporated into the IPR provisions of the statute, the
22standard was properly adopted by PTO regulation.
By contrast, a district court in litigation applies the Phillips v.
23A WH Corp. standard, which is considered potentially narrower than
BRI and should conform to the claim terms' ordinary and customary
19 In re Cuozzo, 793 F.3d 1268, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
20 Id.
21 Id. at 1276- 1278.
22 Id. at 1278-1279.
23 Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1303.
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meaning24, unless the patent applicant has acted as its own
lexicographer or there is "clear disavowal.,25 The Federal Circuit in
Phillips echoed its opinion in Markman v. Westview Instruments,
Inc.,26 that the sources for determining how one of ordinary skill in the
art would understand the claims are intrinsic evidence and extrinsic
evidence.27  Intrinsic sources are the claims, specification, and
prosecution history.28 Extrinsic evidence is everything beyond the
patent and prosecution history, such as dictionaries and expert
testimony. When the intrinsic evidence is unambiguous, a court should
give no weight to extrinsic evidence.29
There are three points that practitioners should realize about the
difference in claim construction standards applied by PTAB and
district courts. First, PTAB will not defer to a district court's claim
construction, if, for example, the patent is/was involved in preceding
or contemporaneous litigation.30 PTAB does not consider the district
court's claim construction "dispositive given the differences in claim
interpretation standards[.]",31 This is true even if a party advocated for
a claim construction in litigation different from the one proposed to
24 International Rectifier Corp. v. IXYS Corp., 361 F.3d 1363, 1370 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (finding that the ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term is the
meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question
at the time of the invention).
25 Id. at 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("The presumption [of ordinary and customary
meaning] will be overcome where the patentee, acting as his own lexicographer, has
set forth a definition for the term different from its ordinary and customary meaning
or where the patentee has disavowed or disclaimed scope of coverage, by using words
or expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction, representing a clear disavowal of
claim scope.").
26 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979-81 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(en banc), aff'd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
27 See also Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir.
1996) ("Intrinsic evidence is the most significant source of the legally operative
meaning of disputed claim language").
28 Pfizer, Inc. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., 429 F.3d 1364, 1373 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (quoting Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313); see also MBO Laboratories, Inc. v. Becton,
Dickinson & Co., 474 F.3d 1323, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Ortho-McNeil Pharmaceutical,
Inc. v. Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, 476 F.3d 1321, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ("A
person of ordinary skill in the art is deemed to have read the claim term in the context
of the entire patent, including the other claims, the specification and the prosecution
history.").
29 Playtex Products, Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 400 F.3d 901, 907 (Fed. Cir.
2005).
30 Google, Inc. v. Whitserve LLC, No. IPR2013-00249, Paper 32, at 21-22
(P.T.A.B. Sept. 9, 2014).
31 Chi Mei Innolux Corp.v. Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co., Ltd., No. IPR2013-
00028, Paper 14, at 14 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 21, 2013).
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PTAB in an IPR.32 PTAB has, however, upon independent review,
occasionally arrived at the same construction as a district court.33
Second, if the claims at issue in an IPR have expired, PTAB will
apply a Phillips standard of claim construction.34 The rationale for
this is that BRI should not apply when the patent owner no longer has
an opportunity to amend the claims.35  If the claims will expire
between institution and a final written decision, PTAB suggests the
parties "address the differences, if any, between the broadest
reasonable construction and the construction applied by a district
court so that we can address them when we render a final written
decision.,36  PTAB has also noted that even if it is applying the
Phillips standard, the other aspects of district court claim construction
do not apply: "there still would be no presumption of validity in this
proceeding and Petitioner's burden of proof is still by a
preponderance of the evidence. Also, we will not be applying a rule
of construction with an aim to preserve the validity of claims.
3 7
Finally, unlike district courts, PTAB so far has been relatively
open to extrinsic evidence in claim construction in IPRs, including
dictionaries, expert testimony, and technical standards.
38
32 Research In Motion Corp. v. WI-LAN USA Inc., No. IPR2013-00126, Paper
10, at 13 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 20, 2013) ("[T]he Board may itself interpret a claim term as a
matter of law notwithstanding what is or is not argued by a party... The Board's
conclusion is not subject to any restriction based on a party's contentions in another
proceeding or even this proceeding.").
33 SDI Techs., Inc. v. Bose Corp., No. IPR2013-00350, Paper 36, at 14-15
(P.T.A.B. Nov. 7, 2014) ("We recognize the differences in the claim construction
framework employed by district courts, but nevertheless are persuaded that the
district court's construction is the broadest reasonable interpretation."); McClinton
Energy Grp., LLC v. Magnum Oil Tools Int'l, Ltd., No. IPR2013-00231, Paper 31, at
10 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 21, 2014); Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Depomed, Inc., No. IPR2014-
00377, Paper 9, at 7 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 10, 2014); Innolux Corp. v. Semiconductor Energy
Lab. Co., Ltd., No. IPR2013-00064, Paper 11, at 10-11 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 30,2013).
34 Cisco Sys., Inc. v. AIP Acquisition, LLC, No. IPR2014-00247, Paper 17, at 3
(P.T.A.B. Jun. 26, 2014); Innolux, No. IPR2013-00064, Paper 11, at 10 (P.T.A.B. Apr.
30, 2013). See also, Amendments to the Rules of Practice for Trials Before the Patent
Trial and Appeal Board, 80 Fed. Reg. 50,720 (Aug. 20, 2015) (in the Proposed Rules
announced by the USPTO on Aug. 20, 2015, a change to Rule § 42.100(b) would
codify that BRI applies to any claim that will not expire before an FWD: "(b) A
claim in an unexpired patent that will not expire before a final written decision is
issued shall be given its broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification
of the patent in which it appears.").
35 In re Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569, 1572 (Fed Cir. 1984).
36 Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd. v. Straight Path IP Grp., Inc., No. IPR2014-01366,
Paper 12, at 6 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 6, 2015).
37 Cisco Sys., Inc. v. AIP Acquisition, LLC, No. IPR2014-00247, Paper 17, at 3-4
(P.T.A.B. Jun. 26, 2014); W. L. Gore & Assocs, Inc. v. Lifeport Scis. LLC, No.
IPR2014-01320, Paper 7, at 8 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 25,2015).
38 St. Jude Med., Cardiology Div., Inc. v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Mich.,
2015]
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B. Impact of Teva
In Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831 (2015),
the Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the standard of
review for claim construction on appeal.39 The Supreme Court held
that when the Federal Circuit reviews a district court's subsidiary
factual determinations made in the course of claim construction, it
must apply a "clear error" standard of review. For evidence intrinsic
to the patent (the patent claims, specification, and prosecution
history), however, this is solely a determination of law and will be
reviewed on appeal de novo.
The Federal Circuit in Cuozzo indicated that Teva applied to
PTAB claim construction decisions:
We review the Board's claim construction according to the
Supreme Court's decision in Teva Pharmaceuticals U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., - U.S. - , 135 S.Ct. 831, 841,
L.Ed.2d (2015). We review underlying factual
determinations concerning extrinsic evidence for
substantial evidence and the ultimate construction of the
claim de novo .... Because there is no issue here as to
extrinsic evidence, we review the claim construction de
novo.
40
However, in Oracle v. Google, 606 Fed. Appx. 990 (Fed. Cir.
March 20, 2015) (non-precedential), the Federal Circuit panel
indicated that whether Teva applied to PTAB claim construction
decisions remained an open question:
...the Supreme Court decided Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v.
Sandoz, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 831 (Jan. 20, 2015), which changed
our standard of review of a district court's factual
determinations in construing a claim. Because the Board
did not base its construction in this case on any findings of
fact, and instead only considered intrinsic evidence, we
need not consider whether Teva also changes our standard
of review on appeals from the Board. (emphasis added)
41
No. IPR2013-00041, Paper 12, at 5-7 (P.T.A.B. May 2, 2013); adidas AG v. NIKE,
Inc., No. IPR2013-00067, Paper 18, at 12, 14 (P.T.A.B. May 17, 2014).
39 Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 836 (2015).
40 In re Cuozzo, 793 F.3d at 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
41 Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google, Inc., 606 F. App'x 990, 993 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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In Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir.
2015), the Federal Circuit opinion authored by Judge Prost reiterated
the position set forth in Cuozzo that PTAB claim construction
decisions are reviewed under the Teva standard:
As a general matter, we review the Board's conclusions of
law de novo and its findings of fact for substantial
evidence. See In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1316
(Fed.Cir.2000). In Teva Pharmaceuticals U.S.A., Inc. v.
Sandoz, Inc., - U.S. - , 135 S.Ct. 831, - L.Ed.2d -
- (2015), the Supreme Court clarified the standards of
review for claim construction. Pursuant to Teva's
framework and our review of Board determinations, we
review the Board's ultimate claim constructions de novo
and its underlying factual determinations involving
extrinsic evidence for substantial evidence. See Teva, 135
S.Ct. at 841-42. In this case, because the intrinsic record
fully determines the proper construction, we review the
Board's claim constructions de novo. Teva, 135 S.Ct. at
840-42. To the extent the Board considered extrinsic
evidence when construing the claims, we need not consider
the Board's findings on that evidence because the intrinsic
record is clear. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303,
1318 (Fed.Cir.2005) (en banc).42
III. WHEN IS CLAIM CONSTRUCTION ADDRESSED DURING IPR?
Claim construction plays a central role throughout an IPR
proceeding, from the filing of the petition until PTAB renders its
FWD. In the petition, a petitioner may propose claim constructions
favorable to securing institution and cancelation of the challenged
claims. In the Patent Owner Preliminary Response (POPR), the
Patent Owner may dispute Petitioner's proposed constructions and/or
make its own proposed claim constructions, hoping to avoid the
asserted prior art and persuade PTAB to deny the petition as a
threshold matter.
In deciding whether to institute, PTAB considers both parties'
proposed constructions, but ultimately does not have to adopt either
and may construe claims independently.43 If PTAB grants the IPR
42 Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d 1292, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
43 Research In Motion Corp. v. WI-LAN USA Inc., No. IPR2013-00126, Paper
10, at 13 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 20, 2013) ("[Tlhe Board may itself interpret a Research In
Motion Corp. v. WI-LAN USA Inc., No. IPR2013 claim term as a matter of law
2015]
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petition, the trial will proceed based upon PTAB's construction
adopted in the institution decision. The Patent Owner may challenge
PTAB's institution decision constructions in its Patent Owner
Response (POR) and in the oral hearing (if there is one). Likewise,
Petitioner may raise claim constructions in its Reply to Patent
Owner's Response and in the oral hearing (if there is one). Finally, in
the FWD, PTAB adopts final claim constructions which may or may
not be the same as in the institution decision."
A. Petition
The rules require an IPR petition to explain "[h]ow the
challenged claim is to be construed," as well as "[h]ow the construed
claim is unpatentable.' '45  Thus, nearly all petitions address claim
construction, at least superficially.46
While not all claim terms require construction, the "failure to
offer a construction of a term critical to understanding the scope of
[challenged] claims" will likely doom a petition or the affected
asserted ground.47 Even if a petitioner proposes that a claim term be
given its plain and customary meaning, PTAB may deny the petition
or asserted ground if Petitioner does not adequately explain or cite
sufficient evidence showing why that construction is appropriate.48
The broad "plain meaning" approach with a proposed construction of
an important term must be balanced against the risk that PTAB will
consider the proposed construction broader than the claim's proper
notwithstanding what is or is not argued by a party.").
44 See, e.g., Facebook, Inc. v. Rembrandt Soc. Media, LP, IPR2014-00415, Paper
33, at 8 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 22, 2015) ("Having reviewed the parties' arguments and
evidence, we are persuaded that our initial construction of "privacy level
information" is incorrect."); see also Biomarin Pharm. Inc. v. Duke University, No.
IPR2013-00535, Paper 86, at 7 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 23, 2015) ("In our Decision to Institute,
we interpreted this phrase to refer to administering an immunosuppressant before the
first administration of any hGAA within a particular administration interval. . . After
considering the entire record before us now, the Specification of the '712 patent, and
Patent Owner's contentions in its Response, we reevaluate that claim construction.").
45 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3)-(4) (2012).
46 See, e.g., Zetec, Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., LLC, No. IPR2014-00384,
Paper 10, at 6-7 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 28, 2014); Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed.
Reg. 48,756, 48,764 (Aug. 14, 2012) ("[lI]t it may be sufficient for a party to provide a
simple statement that the claim terms are to be given their broadest reasonable
interpretation, as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and consistent with
the disclosure.").
47 Jiawei Tech. Ltd. v. Simon Nicholas Richmond, No. IPR2014-00937, Paper 22,
at 7-8 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 16, 2014); Jiawei Tech. Ltd. v. Simon Nicholas Richmond, No.
IPR2014-00938, Paper 20, at 16-17.
48 Jiawei Tech. Ltd. v. Simon Nicholas Richmond, No. IPR2014-00384, Paper 10,
at 6-7 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 23, 2014).
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scope.49
For claims containing means-plus-function limitations, there is an
added requirement that "the construction of the claim must identify
the specific portions of the specification that describe the structure,
material, or acts corresponding to each claimed function.,50  This
requirement parallels the corresponding statutory provision for
construing means-plus-function limitations.51  According to PTAB,
the burden of construing means-plus-function limitations lies with
Petitioner as part of showing that the challenged claims are
unpatentable.52 PTAB will deny a petition rather than take up this
burden and "speculate on the specific disclosure" that corresponds to
the means-plus-function limitations.53
PTAB has taken a strict approach to means-plus-function claims,
denying petitions when Petitioner has provided no analysis or
provided a partial or incomplete analysis. For example, in Panel
Claw, Inc. v. SunPower Corp., No. IPR2014-00388, Petitioner
proposed only constructions of two means-plus-function terms.
5 4
According to the panel, this "purely functional construction" was
insufficient because "[35 U.S.C. 112, 6th para.] requires a narrower
construction . . . covering the corresponding structure, material, or
acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.,55 Thus, in
the petition, petitioners should have proposed claim constructions of
any means-plus-function limitations in the challenged claims,
providing a complete analysis that addresses both the functional
aspects and the "corresponding structure, material, or acts described
in the specification and equivalents thereof." In the context of means-
plus-function claims, therefore, § 112 arises, even though § 112 is not a
basis for unpatentability in an IPR.5 6
49 See Bear Archery, Inc. v. AMS, LLC, No. IPR2014-00700, Paper 9, at 6-7
(P.T.A.B. Aug. 15,2014).
50 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3) (2012).
51 35 U.S.C. § 112(f).
52 AToptech, Inc. v. Synopsys, Inc., No. IPR2014-01160, Paper 9, at 9 (P.T.A.B.
Jan. 21,2013).
53 AToptech, Inc. v. Synopsys, Inc., No. IPR2014-01160, Paper 9, at 17 (P.T.A.B.
Jan. 21, 2013); see also Ericsson Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures I LLC, No. IPR2014-
01331, Paper 9, at 6-7 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 24, 2015).
54 Panel Claw, Inc. v. SunPower Corp., No. IPR2014-00388, Paper 14, at 6-7
(P.T.A.B. Aug. 4, 2014).
55 Panel Claw, Inc. v. SunPower Corp., No. IPR2014-00388, Paper 14, at 7
(P.T.A.B. Aug. 4,2014).
56 See, e.g., Space Exploration Technologies Corp. v. Blue Origin LLC, No.
IPR2014-01378, Paper 6 at 8 (P.T.A.B. March 3, 2015); Ericsson Inc. v. Intellectual
Ventures II LLC, No. IPR2014-01170, Paper 9 at 7-8 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 17, 2015);
Research In Motion Corp. v. Multimedia Ideas LLC, No. IPR2013-00036, Paper 65 at
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. In order to properly propose a construction of a means-plus-
function claim, petitioners need to first correctly identify the claims as
such. In Pride Solutions, LLC v. NOT DEAD YET Mfg., Inc., No.
IPR2013-00627,5 7 Petitioner did not treat the claims as means-plus-
function claims in their proposed claim constructions, which meant it
did not provide any evidence of how the prior art references should be
applied to a means-plus-function claim, and the petition was denied.
B. Patent Owner's Preliminary Response
The POPR is optional for the Patent Owner. If filed, it is due
within three months of the filing date accorded the petition, "setting
forth the reasons why no inter partes review should be instituted.""8
The POPR allows the Patent Owner an opportunity to tell PTAB why
it should not grant the petition. Patent Owners typically use the
POPR to raise potentially dispositive threshold issues, such as time
bars, real party-in-interest/privity issues, or defects in the petition.
The POPR also provides an opportunity for the Patent Owner to
attack the Petitioner's proposed claim constructions and/or provide its
own proposed claim constructions.
Some Patent Owners choose not to file a POPR for strategic
reasons, such as to allow institution and potentially gain estoppel
against the petitioner or related parties,59 to buy additional time to
develop positions, to conserve costs and resources, or to retain the
element of surprise for the post-institution phase. Given high
institution and claim cancelation rates to date, however, the risk of not
addressing claim construction in the POPR is very high.
If the Patent Owner does not address claim construction or
dispute Petitioner's proposed constructions in its POPR, PTAB may
simply adopt Petitioner's proposed constructions, as long as the
9 (P.T.A.B. March 7, 2014) and Panel Claw, Inc. v. SunPower Corp., No. IPR2014-
00388, Paper 14 at 7 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 4, 2014) (stating that although § 112 is not a
ground of unpatentability that can be asserted in an IPR, PTAB denied
petitions/terminated proceedings where PTAB considered the claims indefinite and
therefore not amenable to construction Without a claim construction, PTAB could
not determine whether the claims were unpatentable on the asserted grounds. So far,
these cases have involved means-plus-function claims.).
57 Pride Solutions, LLC v. NOT DEAD YET Mfg., Inc., No. IPR2013-00627,
Paper 14 at 6, 11 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 17, 2014).
58 37 C.F.R. § 42.107 (2014).
59 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(1) (2006) (find that if eventually there is a final written
decision, petitioner "may not request or maintain a proceeding before the Office with
respect to that claim on any ground that the petitioner raised or reasonably could
have raised during that inter partes review."); 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2) (2006) (the
estoppel applies to district court and ITC litigation).
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constructions "do not appear unreasonable at this [preliminary] stage
of the proceeding.,60 If this happens, and trial is instituted based on
the Petitioner's proposed constructions, not only is Patent Owner
faced with an instituted trial, but now possibly has to disabuse PTAB
of Petitioner's unfavorable constructions crafted to achieve
cancelation of the claims. This can be quite an uphill battle, as PTAB
to date has usually retained its institution constructions through trial
and in the Final Written Decision.
It is also possible for PTAB to independently construe the claims
in an unfavorable way to Patent Owner. This is possible whether or
not the Patent Owner proposes claim constructions in the POPR, but
not proposing claim constructions means PTAB does not have the
benefit of Patent Owner's arguments supporting its proposed claim
constructions.
If the Patent Owner files a POPR, it has the opportunity to
deploy an offensive claim construction weapon. A Petitioner may
overlook or avoid construing a problematic claim term, leaving an
opening for the Patent Owner to propose a construction for the key
term that avoids the prior art. For example, in BioDelivery Scis. Int'l,
Inc. v. MonoSol Rx, LLC, No. IPR2014-00794, the challenged claims
recited the phrase "polymer matrix during film casting is a shear-
thinning pseudoplastic fluid when exposed to shear rates of 10-0 5 sec-
,,61 Petitioner proposed no construction for the term, but the Patent
Owner in the POPR did.62 PTAB adopted Patent Owner's proposed
construction that the claimed polymer matrix must exhibit the claimed
property throughout the entire range of 10-105 sec1, found that
Petitioner did not identify any prior art disclosure that satisfied this
requirement, and denied the petition for failing to demonstrate a
reasonable likelihood of prevailing.
63
60 See also ButamaxTM Advanced Biofuels LLC v. Gevo, Inc., No. IPR2013-
00539, Paper 9 at 8-12 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 4, 2014) (largely adopting Petitioner's proposed
constructions where Patent Owner did not file a POPR).
61 BioDelivery Scis. Int'l, Inc. v. MonoSol Rx, LLC, No. IPR2014-00794, Paper 7,
at 5 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 5, 2014).
62 BioDelivery Scis. Int'l, Inc. v. MonoSol Rx, LLC, No. IPR2014-00794, Paper 7,
at 5-6 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 5, 2014).
63 BioDelivery Scis. Int'l, Inc. v. MonoSol Rx, LLC, No. IPR2014-00794, Paper 7.
at 5-6 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 5, 2014).
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C. Institution Decision
1. Claim Construction is an Essential Step in Determining Whether to
Institute Trial
Claim construction has been an essential step in determining
whether to institute an IPR.64  In its institution decision, PTAB
construes the meaning of claim terms it considers necessary to its
detailed analysis of whether there is a reasonable likelihood that at
least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable. Decisions to
institute take into consideration Petitioner's proposed constructions,
any attacks or proposed claim constructions made by the Patent
Owner in the POPR, or any additional constructions proposed by
Patent Owner. PTAB may also construe claim terms not addressed
by either party.
2. Claim Construction May Serve as a Basis for Denial of Petition
PTAB has denied institution of IPR based on claim construction.
In Stryker Corp. v. Karl Storz Endoscopy-America, Inc., PTAB
concluded that "under a broadest reasonable construction in light of
the Specification, the recited term 'camera head' means an endoscopic
video camera, which is a video camera that includes or is adapted to
be connected to an endoscope.',65 Turning to the asserted references,
PTAB found that the claim limitation, as construed, was not present
in one of the references.66 Furthermore, although another reference
was found to disclose the limitation, PTAB held that Petitioner did
not provide any reason to combine the references, and denied the
petition.67
In Lenroc Co. v. Enviro Tech. Chemical Services, Inc., No.
IPR2014-00382, for example, PTAB denied institution based on claim
64 Corning Inc. v. DSM IP Assets B.V., No. IPR2013-00043, Paper 14, at 4
(P.T.A.B. May 13, 2013).
65 Stryker Corp. v. Karl Storz Endoscopy-America, Inc., No. IPR2015-00673,
PaPer 9, at 9 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 3, 2015).
Stryker Corp. v. Karl Storz Endoscopy-America, Inc., No. IPR2015-00673,
Paper 9, at 10 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 3, 2015) ("Petitioner does not direct us to any disclosure
in Eto that describes the camera 1 or the transmitting/ receiving apparatus 150 as an
endoscopic video camera.").
67 Stryker Corp. v. Karl Storz Endoscopy-America, Inc., No. IPR2015-00673,
Paper 9, at 11 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 3, 2015) ("Petitioner does not provide any rationale for
combining Eto and Okada to obtain the recited camera head (i.e., an endoscopic
video camera) . . . [a]ccordingly, we are not persuaded that Petitioner has provided
adequately articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal
conclusion of obviousness.)
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construction of the claim term "wetcake.,68 Petitioner proposed to
construe the phrase "cyanuric acid wetcake" as "a composition
comprising cyanuric acid and water, where the amount of water in the
composition is about 20-40% by weight." Patent Owner argued
Petitioner's proposed construction fails to acknowledge that a
wetcake is a wet solid, which is physically different from a dry solid.
After reviewing the patent specification and prior art cited during the
prosecution history, PTAB agreed with the Patent Owner, noting that
they found the Petitioner's expert's testimony "is at odds with the
intrinsic evidence."
69
In Toshiba Corporation v. Optical Devices, LLC, No. IPR2014-
01440, PTAB denied institution, adopting the meanings of certain
claim terms as construed by a panel in a previous IPR proceeding (No.
IPR2014-00302) for the same patent.70 Based on these constructions,
PTAB found that Petitioner had not established a reasonable
likelihood of prevailing in showing unpatentability of any of the
challenged claims.71 In the previous case, No. IPR2014-00302, the
Petitioner did not propose specific constructions for any of the terms
in the challenged claims, and PTAB adopted the Patent Owner's
proposed constructions.72 Thus, the parties' strategies and PTAB's
rationale for claim construction in one proceeding may impact other
related PTAB proceedings.
3. Whose Construction Prevails in the Institution Decision
In applying the BRI standard, PTAB may adopt Petitioner's
68 Lenroc Co. v. Enviro Tech. Chemical Services, Inc., No. IPR2014-00382, Paper
12, at 6-7, 16 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 24,2014).
69 Lenroc Co. v. Enviro Tech. Chemical Services, Inc., No. IPR2014-00382, Paper
12, at 12 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 24, 2014), see also AVX Corp. v. Greatbatch, Inc., IPR2015-
00710, Paper 9 at 6, 20-22 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 12, 2015) (finding that where PTAB
independently construed the claim limitation, "laminar delamination gap" and, under
PTAB's construction, the asserted prior art did not contain the claim limitation, and
theTpetition was denied).
Toshiba Corp. v. Optical Devices, LLC, IPR2014-01440, Paper 7, at 7
(P.T.A.B. Mar. 10, 2015) ("The panel that denied institution in the IPR2014-00302 ...
("the 302 panel") construed this term . . . The parties agree that the term "focal
plane" should be construed here, as it was construed by the 302 panel . . We are
persuaded that, for purposes of this decision, the 302 panel's construction is the
broadest reasonable construction consistent with the ordinary and customary meaning
of the term and with the Specification of the '913 patent and adopt it.").
71 Toshiba Corp. v. Optical Devices, LLC, IPR2014-01440, Paper 7, at 16
(P.T.A.B. Mar. 10, 2015).
72 Panasonic Corp. v. Optical Devices, LLC, IPR2014-00302, Paper 9, at 7-9
(P.T.A.B. Jul. 11, 2014).
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proposed constructions or Patent Owner's proposed constructions.73
PTAB also may independently construe the claims.
a. Petitioner's Construction
While both parties may propose claim constructions before
PTAB's institution decision, Petitioners are allowed submit expert
declarations or other extrinsic evidence with their petitions to support
their proposed constructions. In contrast, to date, patent owners in
their POPRs are not allowed to submit newly-generated expert
declarations to support their own proposed constructions.74
b. PTAB's Construction
As noted above, PTAB may construe claim terms independently
of the parties' proposed constructions. Often, PTAB may find a need
to set forth its own interpretation of claims to provide more precisely
the ordinary and customary meaning in the art under the BRI
standard. In Oracle Corporation v. Clouding IP, LLC, No. IPR2013-
00088, the challenged independent claims each recited "references to
the determined data manipulation operations.,75 Oracle contended
that "references to the determined data manipulation operations"
should be construed as "an identifier, such as a URL link, that
provides a way of locating and accessing the determined data
manipulation operations." Patent Owner argued that "references to
the determined data manipulation operations" should be construed as
"an identifier corresponding to an available data manipulation
operation." Construing the limitation independently, PTAB noted
that it "is essentially the same as those proffered by Oracle and by
Clouding IP, only stated more precisely.
76
c. Application of the Phillips Standard to Expired Patent
Claims
For claims of an expired patent, PTAB will apply a Phillips
73 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.100, 42.200 (2014).
74 37 C.F.R. § 42.107(c) (2014); Amendments to the Rules of Practice for Trials
Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 80 Fed. Reg. 50,720 (Aug. 20, 2015) (on
August 20, 2015, the USPTO released proposed Amendments to the Rules of Practice
for Trials before PTAB that would allow patent owners to include expert declarations
and other testimonial evidence generated for the IPR in their response to a petition).
75 Oracle Corp. v. Clouding IP, LLC, No. IPR2013-00088, Paper 7 (P.T.A.B. May
14, 2013).
76 Oracle Corp. v. Clouding IP, LLC, No. IPR2013-00088, Paper 7 at 9-10
(P.T.A.B. May 14, 2013).
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standard similar to that of a district court's review.7  Since Patent
Owner can no longer amend the claims, the BRI standard is not
78appropriate.
D. Motions to Amend
In motions to amend, Patent Owners may propose cancellation
of originally-challenged claims or propose substitute claims.79  To
date, PTAB, however, has denied nearly all motions to amend
proposing substitute claims. Sometimes the denial is based on a
Patent Owner's failure to propose a reasonable claim construction for
new claim terms in proposed substitute claims.8°
In a motion to amend, "[a] patent owner should identify
specifically the feature or features added to each substitute claim,...
including construction of new claim terms[.], 81  In JDS Uniphase
Corp. v. Fiber, LLC, No. IPR2013-00318, Patent Owner introduced
two new claim terms- "communications" and "fiber"-in its
proposed substitute claims.8 2  The Motion to Amend, however, did
not suggest a claim construction.3 Without a reasonable construction
of the new claim terms, PTAB concluded, "Patent Owner's Motion
does not provide adequate information for us to determine whether
its proposed substitute claims are patentable over the prior art
77 Innolux Corp. v. Semiconductor Energy Laboratory Co., Ltd., No. IPR2013-
00064, Paper 11, at 10-11 (Apr. 30, 2013) (citing In re Rambus, Inc., 694 F.3d 42, 46
(Fed. Cir. 2012)).
78 Amendments to the Rules of Practice for Trials Before the Patent Trial and
Appeal Board, 80 Fed. Reg. 50,720 (Aug. 20, 2015) (in the Proposed Rules announced
by the USPTO on Aug. 20, 2015, a change to Rule § 42.100(b) would codify that BRI
applies to any claim that will not expire before an FWD: "(b) A claim in an
unexpired patent that will not expire before a final written decision is issued shall be
given its broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent in
which it appears.").
79 35 U.S.C. § 316 (a)(9) (2006).
80 See also infra Article 6, Stacy Lewis and Tom Irving, Amending Rather Than
Cancelling Claims in Inter Partes Reviews.
81 See Idle Free Sys., Inc. v. Bergstrom, Inc., No. IPR2012-00027, Paper 26, at 7
(P.T.A.B. Jun. 11, 2013); see also Nichia Corp. v. Emcore Corp., No. IPR2012-00005,
Paper 68 at 49-50 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 11, 2014); Google Inc. and Apple Inc. v. Jongerius
Panoramic Technologies, LLC, No. IPR2013-00191, Paper 70, at 50 (P.T.A.B. Aug.
12, 2014); LaRose Indus., LLC v. Capriola Corp., No. IPR2013-00120, Paper 37, at 13
(P.T.A.B. Jun. 26, 2014).
82 JDS Uniphase Corp. v. Fiber, LLC, No. IPR2013-00318, Paper 45, at 47
(P.T.A.B. Dec. 5, 2014).
83 JDS Uniphase Corp. v. Fiber, LLC, No. IPR2013-00318, Paper 45, at 47
(P.T.A.B. Dec. 5, 2014); see also Google Inc. and Apple Inc. v. Jongerius Panoramic
Technologies, LLC, No. IPR2013-00191, Paper 70, at 50 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 12, 2014).
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generally."8 4  Similarly in CBS Interactive Inc. v. Helferich Patent
Lic., LLC, No. IPR2013-00033,"5 PTAB found that the Patent Owner
did not meet its burden of proof because it did not explain whether
the claim construction for a means-plus-function limitation in original
claims applied to the new limitation in proposed substitute claims.8 6
Even when a motion to amend includes a proposed claim
construction for new claim terms, PTAB may disagree with the
proposed construction.8 7 Simply proposing a claim construction in a
motion to amend proposing substitute claims does not automatically
mean PTAB will adopt it.
PTAB does not analyze the proposed substitute claims in a
vacuum, but in the context of all filings in the IPR to date, and
motions to amend come after the decision on institution. In one case,
in its Motion to Amend, the Patent Owner attempted to re-visit the
institution claim construction of the original challenged claims. PTAB
found such an attempt improper and maintained the institution claim
construction for those claims.88  Therefore, in proposing claim
constructions in Motions to Amend proposing substitute claims,
Patent Owners should take into account, and try to ensure consistency
with, PTAB's institution claim constructions. Or very specifically
argue why the institution claim constructions should not apply. After
all, proposed substitute claims replace originally challenged claims:
"Each proposed claim should be traceable to an original challenged
claim as a proposed substitute for that claim."8 9 PTAB is not likely to
adopt a new proposed claim construction that would render the claim
construction of the originally challenged claims surplus or
contradictory.
84 JDS Uniphase Corp. v. Fiber, LLC, No. IPR2013-00318, Paper 45, at 48
(P.T.A.B. Dec. 5, 2014).
85 CBS Interactive Inc. v. Helferich Patent Lic., LLC, No. IPR2013-00033, Paper
122 at 50, 51-52 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 3, 2014), aff'd, Helferich Patent Licensing, LLC v.
CBS Interactive, Inc., 599 Fed.Appx. 955 (Fed. Cir. April 8, 2015).
86 CBS Interactive Inc. v. Helferich Patent Lic., LLC, No. IPR2013-00033, Paper
122 at 52 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 3, 2014).
87 Microsoft Corp. v. Surfcast, Inc., No. IPR2013-00292, -00293, -00294, and -
00295, Paper 93, at 44-45 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 14, 2014) (disapproving of claim construction
that improperly imports limitations from the specification into the claims); see also
Google Inc. v. Jongerius Panoramic Technologies, LLC, IPR2013-00191, Paper 70, at
49-50 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 12, 2014); Spectra Logic Corp. v. Overland Storage Inc., No.
IPR2013-00357, Paper 26, at 31-32 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 7, 2014); Tandus Flooring, Inc. v.
Interface, Inc., No. IPR2013-00333, Paper 67, at 55 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 8,2014).
88 Google Inc. v. Jongerius Panoramic Technologies, No. IPR2013-00191, Paper
70, at 50 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 12, 2014).
89 See Nichia Corp. v. Emcore Corp., No. IPR2012-00005, Paper 68, at 50
(P.T.A.B. Feb. 11, 2014).
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E. Final Written Decision (FWD)
In IPR proceedings as of July 1, 2015, PTAB addressed claim
construction in 96% of its FWDs.90 Among those decisions, 96% of
the FWDs applied the "broadest reasonable interpretation" (BRI)
standard for construction of claim terms in an unexpired patent.91 In
the few cases where the challenged claims had expired or expired after
institution, PTAB applied the Phillips standard.92 PTAB reasons that
for claims of an expired patent, its interpretation of the claims is
similar to that of a district court's review.
93
In Amkor Technology, Inc. v. Tessera, Inc., No. IPR2013-00242,
Patent Owner communicated its intent to file a terminal disclaimer in
the patent at issue in the IPR, and asked PTAB to apply the Phillips
standard because, with the terminal disclaimer, the claims would
expire before the proceeding would end.94 Patent Owner also
"requested authorization, if the terminal disclaimer is filed, to file a
motion to terminate the proceeding on the basis that the Board
applied the broadest reasonable interpretation standard in the
decision to institute this interpartes review."
95
Patent Owner subsequently filed its terminal disclaimer and
notified PTAB, six months after the institution decision and four
months after the Patent Owner Response. Patent Owner also filed a
90 Source: Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, LLP Research,
http://www.aiablog.com/claim-and-case-disposition/ [http://perma.cc/N9Q8-RARZ]
(with courtesy extended to Dan Klodowski, Kai Rajan, Elliot Cook, and Joe
Schaffner).
91 Source: Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, LLP Research,
http://www.aiablog.com/claim-and-case-disposition/ [http://perma.cc/N9Q8-RARZ]
(with courtesy extended to Dan Klodowski, Kai Rajan, Elliot Cook, and Joe
Schaffner); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b).
92 Facebook, Inc. v. Software Rights Archive, LLC, No. IPR2013-00481, Paper
54, at 5 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 29, 2015) (accepting Patent Owner's construction consistent
with those set forth in the on-going district court litigation); see also Universal
Remote Control, Inc. v. Universal Elecs., Inc., IPR2013-00127, Paper 32, at 5
(P.T.A.B. Jun. 30, 2014).
93 Facebook, Inc. v. Software Rights Archive, LLC, No. IPR2013-00481, Paper 54
at 5; In re Rambus, Inc., 694 F.3d 42, 46 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Amendments to the Rules
of Practice for Trials Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 80 Fed. Reg. 50,720
(Aug. 20, 2015) (in the Proposed Rules announced by the USPTO on Aug. 20, 2015, a
change to Rule § 42.100(b) would codify that BRI applies to any claim that will not
expire before an FWD: "(b) A claim in an unexpired patent that will not expire
before a final written decision is issued shall be given its broadest reasonable
construction in light of the specification of the patent in which it appears.").
94 Amkor Technology, Inc. v. Tessera, Inc., No. IPR2013-00242, Paper 117 at 2
(P.T.A.B. Apr. 14, 2014).
95 Amkor Technology, Inc. v. Tessera, Inc., No. IPR2013-00242, Paper 117 at 2
(P.T.A.B. Apr. 14, 2014).
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request for rehearing of the decision to institute, but it did not raise
any objection to the BRI standard applied by PTAB in its institution
decision.
PTAB was not willing to allow the Patent Owner to "change the
standard at the last minute[,]" and ordered the terminal disclaimer
"held in abeyance" until the IPR was finished.96 In the POR, Patent
Owner did not raise any objection to PTAB's institution claim
constructions. Instead, "Patent Owner cited and expressly applied the
interpretations provided in the Decision on Institution.,97  PTAB
appeared unhappy with the notion of changing the claim construction
standard so late in the proceeding: "had numerous opportunities to
challenge our application of the broadest reasonable interpretation
standard, or any of our interpretations based on that standard, but
waited until the last minute to raise the prospect of filing a terminal
disclaimer.98 PTAB agreed with Petitioner that there could be abuse
of the proceeding if "[a] patent owner could participate fully in a
proceeding, wait and see what arguments are made by the petitioner
and how the proceeding develops, and then, at the very last minute,
disclaim the remaining term of the patent and disrupt the entire
proceeding.
99
1. What Influences Claim Construction in the FWD?
While PTAB's BRI of claim terms in most cases is based on the
intrinsic evidence (i.e., the claims, specification, and prosecution
history), PTAB also refers to extrinsic evidence to support its claim
constructions. This extrinsic evidence includes evidence regarding
how a person of ordinary skill in the art would interpret claim terms
and the disclosure of the specification. If the intrinsic evidence does
not provide a definition of a claim term, PTAB really only has
extrinsic evidence as a guide.100'101  Extrinsic evidence is more
96 Amkor Technology, Inc. v. Tessera, Inc., No. IPR2013-00242, Paper 129 at 3
(P.T.A.B. May 22, 2014).
97 Amkor Technology, Inc. v. Tessera, Inc., No. IPR2013-00242, Paper 129 at 3
(P.T.A.B. May 22, 2014).
98 Amkor Technology, Inc. v. Tessera, Inc., No. IPR2013-00242, Paper 129 at 8
(P.T.A.B. May 22, 2014).
99 Amkor Technology, Inc. v. Tessera, Inc., No. IPR2013-00242, Paper 129 at 11-
121(P.T.A.B. May 22, 2014).
See generally infra Article 8, Amanda Murphy et al., Adjusting for the New
Normal: Thoughts on Enhancing the Possibilities of Success for the Patent Owner in
an AIA Post-Grant Proceeding.
101 See, e.g., Apple, Inc. v. Achates Ref. Pub., Inc., No. IPR2013-00080, Paper 21
(P.T.A.B. June 3, 2013) Apple, Inc. v. Achates Ref. Pub., Inc., No. IPR2013-00080,
Paper 90 (P.T.A.B. June 2, 2014); Veeam Software Corp. v. Symantec Corp., No.
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accessible to PTAB under the BRI standard, as opposed to the
Phillips standard under which intrinsic sources (claims, specification,
and prosecution history) are paramount.10 2  The following chart
illustrates statistical data for PTAB's reliance on the various
evidentiary sources for claim construction. 103,104









PTAB relies on dictionaries to support the plain meaning of a
claim term. For example, in Berk-Tek v. Belden, No. IPR2013-00057,
PTAB agreed with Petitioner's proposed construction of the term
"circumferential," citing a standard dictionary to support that the
construction was consistent with the ordinary meaning of the term.
105
Where the specification lacks a definition of a claim term at issue,
PTAB has relied on the dictionary definition to support its own
construction of a plain meaning of the claim term.
10 6
IPR2013-00141, Paper 50, at 7 (P.T.A.B. July 29, 2014) (relying on a technical
dictionary to define certain claim terms).
102 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en bane).
103 Source: Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, LLP Research,
(with courtesy extended to Dan Klodowski, Kai Rajan, Elliot Cook, and Joe
Schaffner).
104 Thomas Irving et al., Teva's Effect on Review of PTAB Claim Construction
Rulings, LAW360 (May 11, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/650953/teva-s-
effect-on-review-of-ptab-claim-construction-rulings [http://perma.cc/Y27Z-SPBK].
(citing Finnegan research, as of April 1, 2015).
105 Berk-Tek v. Belden, No. IPR2013-00057, Paper 46, at 11 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 18,
2014).
106 Zodiac Pool Systems, Inc., v. Aqua Products, Inc., No. IPR2013-00159, Paper
71, at 12-13 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 22, 2014); see also St. Jude Med., Inc. v. The Bd. of
Regents of The Univ. of Mich., No. IPR2013-00041, Paper 12 (P.T.A.B. May 2, 2013)
(construing the "plain and ordinary meaning" of "alcohol" to include trihydric
alcohols based on a dictionary, while noting that the specification did not indicate
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b. Expert Testimony
PTAB has also relied on expert testimony, another form of
extrinsic evidence, in support of its claim constructions. Rather than
adopting the expert testimony directly, PTAB has considered the
expert testimony on how a person of ordinary skill in the art would
interpret claim terms or the disclosure of the specification regarding
the claim terms.10 7 The expert testimony needs to identify underlying
facts or data on which the opinion is based.08 Often, PTAB will not
credit the expert testimony when it stands alone without accounting
for the specification.'
0 9
In Game Show Network, LLC v. John H. Stephenson, No.
IPR2013-00289, the claim phrase at issue was "playing a game of skill
in a qualifying round between a single player and the host
computer."'110 In its Decision on Institution, PTAB interpreted the
above-quoted term to mean playing a game of skill in a qualifying
round, where the game includes only one human player and is at least
administered by a host computer."' Petitioner agreed with PTAB,
but the Patent Owner did not. Both parties argued that the
specification was consistent with their respective proposed
constructions. In the FWD, PTAB reviewed the expert testimony
from both sides regarding how a person of ordinary skill in the art
would interpret the specification.'2  PTAB gave more weight to
Petitioner's expert than Patent Owner's, finding that the Petitioner's
departure from the ordinary meaning or disavowal of the full scope of "alcohol").
07 See Carl Zeiss SMT GMBH v. Nikon Corp., No. IPR2013-00362, Paper 41
(P.T.A.B. Nov. 4, 2014); Amneal Pharm., LLC v. Supernus Pharm., Inc., No.
IPR2013-00368, Paper 94 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 9, 2014) (weighing the expert declarations
from both parties);
Ariosa Diagnostics v. Isis Innovation, Ltd., No. IPR2012-00022, Paper 166, at 20-26
(P.T.A.B. Sept. 2, 2014) (noting that PTAB's interpretation for the claim limitation is
consistent with the construction used by Isis's expert at trial).
108 See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (2015) ("Expert testimony that does not disclose the
underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no
weight."); Toyota Motor Corp. v. American Vehicular Scis. L.L.C., No. IPR2013-
00416, Paper 54, at 10-11 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 5,2014).
109 ZTE Corp. v. ContentGuard Holdings, Inc., No. IPR2013-00133, Paper 61, at
21 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 1, 2014); see also Berk-Tek LLC v. Belden Techs. Inc., No. IPR2013-
00069, Paper 24, at 13 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 28, 2014).
110 Game Show Network, L.L.C. v. Stephenson, No. IPR2013-00289, Paper 8, at 6
(P.T.A.B. Nov. 11, 2013).
ill Game Show Network, L.L.C. v. Stephenson, No. IPR2013-00289, Paper 8, at 6
(P.T.A.B. Nov. 11, 2013).
112 Game Show Network, L.L.C. v. Stephenson, No. IPR2013-00289, Paper 51, at
10-11 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 7, 2013).
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testimony "is consistent with the words from the specification.""
3
c. Party Admission
PTAB has relied on party admissions during trial.'1 4  For
instance, in Redline Detection, LLC v. Star EnviroTech, Inc., No.
IPR2013-00106, PTAB construed several disputed claim terms in its
FWD, citing transcripts of the oral hearing as party admissions. 
115
d. Related PTAB Proceedings
PTAB has adopted the claim construction of another PTAB
proceeding for the same terms of related patents. For example, in
SAP America, Inc. v. Lakshmi Arunachalam, No. IPR2013-00194,
PTAB considered the construction it adopted for the claim term
"Web application" in CBM2013-00013.1 6 PTAB also considered the
claim construction for the same term adopted in No. IPR2014-00413
for a patent issued from the parent application."7 PTAB found the
construction in those related proceedings applicable, and adopted it
for this proceeding."8
e. Related District Court Litigation
PTAB has adopted claim constructions set forth in district court
litigation." 9 In Kyocera Corp. v Softview LLC, No. IPR2013-00007,
for instance, PTAB construed the claim terms as they were construed
by the district court in co-pending litigation.1 20  Instead of merely
113 Game Show Network, L.L.C. v. Stephenson, No. IPR2013-00289, Paper 51, at
10-11 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 7, 2013).
114 See ScentAir Techs., Inc. v. Prolitec, Inc., No. IPR2013-00179, Paper 60
(P.T.A.B. June 26, 2014).
115 Redline Detection, L.L.C. v. Star EnviroTech, Inc., No. IPR2013-00106, Paper
66, at 9- 12 (P.T.A.B. June 30, 2014).
116 SAP Am., Inc. v. Arunachalam, No. IPR2013-00194, Paper 67, at 12 (P.T.A.B.
Sept. 18, 2014).
17 SAP Am., Inc. v. Arunachalam, No. IPR2013-00194, Paper 67, at 12-13
(P.T.A.B. Sept. 18, 2014) (citing SAP Am., Inc. v. Pi-Net, Int'l., CBM2013-00013,
Paper 13, at 25 (P.T.A.B. June 27, 2013)).
SAP Am., Inc. v. Arunachalam, No. IPR2013-00194, Paper 67, at 14 (P.T.A.B.
Sept. 18, 2014).
19 McClinton Energy Grp., L.L.C. v. Magnum Oil Tools Int'l, Ltd., No. IPR2013-
00231, Paper 32 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 2, 2014); Universal Remote Control, Inc. v. Universal
Elecs., Inc., No. IPR2013-00127, Paper 32 (P.T.A.B. June 30, 2014); Intellectual
Ventures Mgmt, Inc. v. Xilinx, Inc., No. IPR2012-00023, Paper 35 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 11,
2014); Veeam Software Corp. v. Symantec Corp., No. IPR2013-00150, Paper 54
(P.T.A.B. July 29, 2014).
120 Kyocera Corp. v Softview LLC., No. IPR2013-00007, No. IPR2013-00256,
Paper 53 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 27,2014).
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adopting the district court's construction, however, PTAB carefully
showed that the district court construction was consistent with BRI.'2'
In contrast, in Google, Inc. v. Whitserve LLC, No. IPR2013-00249,




Apart from the use of dictionary definitions discussed above,
technical standards in the relevant field have occasionally been relied
upon in an FWD in support of PTAB's interpretation of claim
terms.'
23
2. Whether PTAB Changes or Maintains its Institution Constructions
In most cases, PTAB maintains the claim construction adopted in
the institution decision in the FWD. Generally, if the parties do not
dispute PTAB's institution constructions, or no further dispositive
evidence arises, there is no reason to stray from the constructions set
forth in the institution decision.24 However, there are cases where
PTAB reconsidered and changed its institution construction in the
FWD, even without a party objecting. For example, in Harmonic,
Inc., v. Avid Technology, Inc., No. IPR2013-00252, PTAB stated:
121 Kyocera Corp. v Softview LLC., No. IPR2013-00007, No. IPR2013-00256,
Paper 20 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 29, 2013).
22 Google, Inc. v. Whitserve L.L.C., No. IPR2013-00249, Paper 32, at 18
(P.T.A.B. Sept. 9, 2014).
123 Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., No. IPR2012-00042, Paper 60, at 19-
20 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 19, 2014) (agreeing that the definition set forth in IEEE standards
cited by the expert is the ordinary and customary meaning of the claim term
"instrumentation").
124 Redline Detection, No. IPR2013-00106, Paper 66, at 8 (P.T.A.B. June 30, 2014)
("For purposes of our decision to institute inter partes review, we set forth initial
claim constructions for several disputed claim terms. We now construe those terms
under the broadest reasonable interpretation standard for this final written decision.
Nevertheless, to the extent that the parties do not dispute our constructions of claim
terms or have indicated that the terms need not be construed expressly to support
their arguments, we adopt the constructions set forth in the decision to institute.");
Shaw Indus. Grp., Inc. v. Automated Creel Sys., Inc., No. IPR2013-00132, Paper 43, at
10 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 24, 2014) ("The parties do not dispute these interpretations in their
Patent Owner Responses and Replies, and we incorporate our previous analysis for
purposes of this decision."); LaRose Indus., L.L.C. v. Capriola Corp., No. IPR2013-
00120, Paper 37, at 13 (P.T.A.B. June 26, 2014) ("Neither Patent Owner nor
Petitioner challenges our interpretation in the decision to institute of certain terms of
claim 1, 12, 18, and 26 that also appear in substitute claims 28-31. Paper 22, 2-7.
Because the interpretations of those terms are not challenged, to the extent that they
are necessary for assessing the application of the cited art to the substitute claims,
they are adopted for purposes of this final decision.").
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In our Decision on Institution, we adopted Petitioner's
proposed construction for the claim phrase "input switch..
. capable of controlling the video data flow rate" as
"controlling the time, duration, and rate at which video
data flows into the selected input lines, and includes some
level of control beyond simply turning flow on or off." Dec.
on Institution 11; see Pet. 12. Patent Owner does not
dispute the claim construction of the aforementioned claim
phrase. ... Upon further review of the '291 Patent
Specification, the inclusion of "into the selected input
lines" is not consistent with the '291 Patent Specification.
... Accordingly, applying the broadest reasonable
construction standard, we now construe "input switch...
capable of controlling the video data flow rate" as
"controlling the time, duration, and rate at which video
data flows, and includes some level of control beyond
simply turning flow on or off.'
125
Sometimes PTAB identifies an additional claim term that was
not construed by the parties or in the institution decision and
considers it necessary to construe that term to resolve the IPR. In this
case, PTAB may construe the term for the first time in the FWD. For
example, in Harmonic, Inc., v. Avid Technology, Inc., No. IPR2013-
00252, PTAB acknowledged that it did not construe the claim
limitation "a predefined period of time" in its institution decision but
construed it in the FWD.26
A change in the panel may affect the claim construction in the
FWD as well. In Smith & Nephew, Inc. v. Convatec Technologies,
Inc., No. IPR2013-00102, a panel consisting of Judges Tierney, Green,
and Guest delivered the institution decision containing PTAB's initial
constructions.'27 The FWD panel included Judge Snedden in place of
Judge Tierney.128 Judge Snedden wrote a concurring opinion in the
FWD disagreeing with the majority's institution construction of a key
term while concurring with the majority's unpatentability
125 Harmonic, Inc., v. Avid Tech., Inc., No. IPR2013-00252, Paper 27, at 8-9
(P.T.A.B. July 10, 2014).
126 Harmonic, Inc., v. Avid Tech., Inc., No. IPR2013-00252, Paper 27, at 10
(P.T.A.B. July 10, 2014).
127 Smith & Nephew, Inc. v. Convatec Techs., Inc., No. IPR2013-00102, Paper 9
(P.T.A.B. May 31, 2013).
128 Smith & Nephew, Inc. v. Convatec Techs., Inc., No. IPR2013-00102, Paper 87,
at 62 (P.T.A.B. May 29, 2014).
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conclusion.129 The Patent Owner appealed, and the Federal Circuit
affirmed without opinion.3 °
Finally, the parties' positions taken during the IPR and
additional evidentiary material submitted during discovery may affect
the claim construction adopted in the FWD, as explained in the next
section.'3
3. The Effect of Discovery on FWD Constructions
Additional extrinsic evidence submitted during discovery
effected the FWD's claim construction in Amneal Pharm., LLC v.
Supernus Pharm., Inc., No. IPR2013-00368.32 In that case, PTAB
identified the term "delayed release" as the only term requiring
construction, but neither party had proposed a construction for it. The
specification did not expressly define "delayed release." Following a
request by PTAB at the oral hearing, both parties pin cited record
evidence for the plain meaning of "delayed release."
133
Upon review of the evidence, PTAB found that a FDA guidance
document submitted as an exhibit to the POR correctly defined the
term "delayed release.""134  In the FWD, PTAB referred to this
document as "other evidence of how the term is understood and used
by persons of ordinary skill in the art.,1 35 Then it construed "delayed
release" to mean "release of a drug at a time other than immediately
following oral administration," using language from the FDA
129 Smith & Nephew, Inc. v. Convatec Techs., Inc., No. IPR2013-00102, Paper 87,
at 62 (P.T.A.B. May 29, 2014).
130 Convatec Techs., Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 612 Fed.Appx. 612 (Fed. Cir.
Aug. 10, 2015).
131 See, e.g., Biomarin Pharm., Inc. v. Duke Univ., No. IPR2013-00535, Paper 86,
at 7 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 23, 2015) ("In our Decision to Institute, we interpreted this phrase to
refer to administering an immunosuppressant before the first administration of any
hGAA within a particular administration interval... After considering the entire
record before us now, the Specification of the '712 patent, and Patent Owner's
contentions in its Response, we reevaluate that claim construction."); see also
Facebook, Inc. v. Rembrandt Social Media, L.P., No. IPR2014-00415, Paper 33, at 8
(P.T.A.B. June 22, 2015) ("Having reviewed the parties' arguments and evidence, we
are persuaded that our initial construction of "privacy level information" is
incorrect.").
132 Amneal Pharm., LLC v. Supernus Pharm., Inc., No. IPR2013-00368, Paper 94
(P.T.A.B. Dec. 9, 2014).
133 Amneal Pharm., LLC v. Supernus Pharm., Inc., No. IPR2013-00368, Paper 92,
at 48:7-49:6, 70:7-72:2, 80:11-81:20 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 12, 2014).
134 Amneal Pharm., LLC v. Supernus Pharm., Inc., No. IPR2013-00368, Paper 94,
at 5 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 9, 2014).
135 Amneal Pharm., LLC v. Supernus Pharm., Inc., No. IPR2013-00368, Paper 94,
at 8 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 9, 2014).




Some patent owners have argued that the BRI standard should
not apply in IPRs, particularly where claim terms have already been
construed by a district court. These patent owners have noted that the
BRI standard is solely an "examination expedient," rather than a rule
of claim construction, that is justified during the examination process
only because the applicant has the opportunity to freely amend the
claims.137  By contrast, PTAB itself recognizes that IPR is not an
examination but is "more adjudicatory than examinational, in
nature., 138 Accordingly, the adjudicatory nature of IPR coupled with
the very limited ability to amend claims to date during IPR means that
the rationale underpinning the BRI should not apply.
139
PTAB has so far uniformly rejected these types of arguments,
and the Federal Circuit affirmed in In re Cuozzo, 793 F.3d 1268 (Fed.
Cir. 2015). According to the Federal Circuit, the BRI should be
applied in IPR even though the AIA does not expressly identify the
claim construction standard to be used.140 The Court also rejected the
amendment-based justification argument against applying the BRI in
IPR, finding that "IPR proceedings are not materially different" from
the earlier PTO proceedings because, "[a]lthough the opportunity to
amend is cabined in the IPR setting, it is thus nonetheless
available.'
' 41
Patent reform efforts have picked up this issue. The "Support
Technology and Research for Our Nation's Growth Patents Act of
2015" (the "STRONG Patents Act of 2015", S. 632), introduced to the
136 Amneal Pharm., LLC v. Supernus Pharm., Inc., No. IPR2013-00368, Paper 94,
at 8 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 9, 2014).
137 See, e.g., Silicon Labs., Inc. v. Cresta Tech. Corp., No. IPR2014-00809, Paper 8
(P.T.A.B. Aug. 22, 2014) (citing In re Skvorecz, 580 F.3d 1262, 1267-68 (Fed. Cir.
2009); In re Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1984)); A.C. Dispensing Equip.
Inc. v. Prince Castle L.L.C., No. IPR2014-00511, Paper 9 (P.T.A.B. June 30, 2014).
138 Idle Free Sys., Inc. v. Bergstrom, Inc., No. IPR2012-00027, Paper 26, at 6
(P.T.A.B. June 11, 2013).
139 See, e.g., Silicon Labs., Inc. v. Cresta Tech. Corp., No. IPR2014-00809, Paper 8
(P.T.A.B. Aug. 22, 2014); A.C. Dispensing Equip. Inc. v. Prince Castle L.L.C., No.
IPR2014-00511, Paper 9 (P.T.A.B. June 30, 2014).
140 In re Cuozzo Speed Tech., L.L.C., 793 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see
Facebook, Inc. v. B.E. Tech. L.L.C., No. IPR2014-00052,-00053,-000698,-00743,-
00744, Paper 45, at 17-18 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 31, 2015) (citing In re Cuozzo, PTAB
disagreed with the petitioner's argument that the Board lacked substantive rule-
making authority as related to its use of the broadest reasonable claim construction
standard.).
141 In re Cuozzo, 793 F.3d. at 1278.
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Senate on March 3, 2015, includes an express provision that in IPRs:
(A) each claim of a patent shall be construed as the claim
would be construed under section 282(b) in an action to
invalidate a patent, including by construing each claim of
the patent in accordance with-
(i) the ordinary and customary meaning of the claim
as understood by a person having ordinary skill in the
art to which the claimed invention pertains; and
(ii) the prosecution history pertaining to the patent;
and
(B) if a court has previously construed a claim of a patent
or a claim term in a civil action to which the patent owner
was a party, the Office shall consider that claim
construction.
Another current patent reform bill, the Goodlatte bill or
"Innovation Act," (H.R. 9) also includes a section relating to claim
construction:
(A) each claim of a patent shall be construed as such claim
would be in a civil action to invalidate a patent under
section 282(b), including construing each claim of the
patent in accordance with the ordinary and customary
meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary
skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the
patent; and
(B) if a court has previously construed the claim or a claim
term in a civil action in which the patent owner was a party,
the Office shall consider such claim construction.
A third proposed bill, the PATENT Act (S. 1137) requires
claim construction using district court standard and, if there is one,
consideration of district court claim construction.
These suggestions are not particularly helpful, since PTAB
already can and sometimes does, "consider" a claim construction
adopted by a district court. But it highlights the complications that
the new AIA post-grant proceedings have brought, largely because
the historic standards before the USPTO (no presumption of validity,
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broadest reasonable claim construction, and preponderance of the
evidence) developed when the USPTO proceedings were primarily ex
parte. The new AIA post-grant proceedings are inter partes, more
adversarial than prosecutorial, much faster than other Office
proceedings, and it is not an easy nor automatic fit with the historic
standards.
Perhaps Patent Owners may find more comfort in the Federal
Circuit's oversight of PTAB. In particular, the recent decision of
Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2015),
where the Federal Circuit, although agreeing that PTAB's use of BRI
is appropriate, vacated PTAB's finding of unpatentability because
PTAB adopted an "unreasonably" broad construction:
That is not to say, however, that the Board may construe
claims during IPR so broadly that its constructions are
unreasonable under general claim construction principles.
As we have explained in other contexts, "[t]he protocol of
giving claims their broadest reasonable interpretation ...
does not include giving claims a legally incorrect
interpretation." ... Even under the broadest reasonable
interpretation, the Board's construction "cannot be
divorced from the specification and the record evidence,"
...A construction that is "unreasonably broad" and which
does not "reasonably reflect the plain language and
disclosure" will not pass muster. [internal citations
omitted]
142
It remains to be seen whether this decision has a cooling effect
on PTAB's application of BRI. It also remains to be seen what PTAB
does with a decision on remand, since that situation is not addressed
in the statute or rules.
There are also USPTO reassurances that motions-to-amend
practice will get less Patent Owner-unfriendly, with practitioners
directed to an ever-growing body of PTAB case law relating to
motions-to-amend practice,43 and comments in the Proposed Rule
package.144
142 Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d 1292, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
143 See Nichia Corp. v. Emcore Corp., No. IPR2012-00005, Paper 27 (P.T.A.B
June 3, 2013); Idle Free Sys., No. IPR2012-00027, Paper 26; Int'l Flavors, No.
IPR2013-00124, Paper 12; Corning Optical Commun. RF, L.L.C. v. PPC Broadband,
Inc., No. IPR2014-00441, Paper 19 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 30, 2014); Masterlmage 3D, Inc. v.
RealD, Inc., No. IPR2015-00040, Paper 42 (P.T.A.B. July 15, 2015).
144 See, e.g., Commentary to Proposed Rules released Aug. 20, 2015; see also
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V. SUMMARY: PRACTITIONERS PREPARE FOR DESIRED CLAIM
CONSTRUCTION AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE
If a patent is the subject of litigation and an IPR, differences
between the Phillips and BRI claim construction standards may
present obstacles, particularly for Patent Owners. In litigation, the
Patent Owner wants the claims to be construed broadly enough to
capture infringement, while in IPR, the patent owner wants the claims
to be construed narrowly enough to avoid prior art under the BRI
standard. Balancing these competing interests in the two types of
proceedings, each with a different claim construction standard, can be
a challenge.
Since the ability to amend claims in IPRs has, to date, been very
limited, patent owners need to try to lay the foundation for the
desired claim construction when drafting the claim language and
specification. This means following fundamental drafting principles,
such as checking whether each claim term is necessary, clearly
defined, and consistently used. Perhaps it also means using words that
some have called "patent profanity," such as "critical," "key,"
"fundamental," "necessary." Profanity for some but not all
embodiments could put limits on BRI and could be advantageous to
the patent owner in an IPR,45 while embodiments without profanity
can provide a broad (fully-supported) claim scope for infringement
purposes. Applicants may consider drafting the specification with
multiple embodiments to mirror and support the range of claims from
broad to narrow. The specification should be designed with the goal
of supporting a BRI that is not unreasonable.
Other approaches include using dependent claims to set up a
tiered claim scope through claim differentiation. This may be useful
in situations where a patent family is pending and amending the
specification or drafting a new one is not an option. Instead, the
applicant may amend the claims in a pending application or file a
continuation application to pursue new patentably distinct claims.
These efforts may help minimize having to make any post-grant
Director's Forum: A Blog from USPTO's Leadership, United States Patent and
Trademark Office, http://www.uspto.gov/blog/ [http://perma.cc/Q57A-DLF5];
Boardside chat: Interview with Chief Judge James Donald Smith, United States
Patent and Trademark Office, (Feb. 3, 2015),
http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/boardside-chat_2015_2_3.pdf
[http://perma.cc/L987-KKVC].
I See, e.g., Conopco, Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Co., No. IPR2013-00510, Paper 2,
at 59 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 14, 2013) (stating a Petitioner argued "there is no evidence in the
'155 patent or its file history of the criticality of the recited ranges in the compositions
as claimed[.]").
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amendments down the road. It may also lay the basis for the patent
owner's desired claim construction, both at PTAB and in district court
litigation.
